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• Hundreds of more-or-less proven low-carbon technologies are competing for market
share in the low-carbon system. In order to bring about the transition to a low-carbon
energy and transport system at the lowest cost, policymakers should rely as much
as possible on private action to choose, develop and deploy low-carbon
technologies.
• For those market failures that might only be overcome with technology-specific
measures, governments should set up a transparent and predictable mechanism
for selecting technologies.
Georg Zachmann (georg.zachmann@bruegel.org) is a Research Fellow at Bruegel. This
Policy Contribution largely draws on research conducted for The great transformation:
decarbonising Europe’s energy and transport systems by Georg Zachmann, Michael Hol-
termann, Jörg Radeke, Mimi Tam, Mark Huberty, Dmytro Naumenko and Anta Ndoye Faye
(Bruegel Blueprint 16, 2012). The research leading to these results has received funding
from the Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH). The views expressed in this
publication are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of FCH.
Telephone
+32 2 227 4210 
info@bruegel.org
www.bruegel.org 
BRU EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
CUTTING CARBON, NOT THE ECONOMY
GEORG ZACHMANN, FEBRUARY 2012
02
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
1. Many observers dismiss
biofuels based on expected
cost (C. Ford Runge & Ben-
jamin Senauer 2007; Lisa
Ryan et al, 2006; Juan Del-
gado and Indhira Santos,
2008).
2. Side-benefits include the
reduction of local pollutant
and noise emissions. Fur-
thermore, decarbonising
the economy based on new
technologies could induce
growth, and may lead to
innovation spillovers that
can help to reduce emis-
sions even in countries that
have no, or less stringent,
climate change policies (eg
by making green technolo-
gies cheaper than dirty
alternatives).
A DRASTIC CHANGE in the way we produce and con-
sume energy is necessary in order to contain the
risk of a global environmental catastrophe. For its
part, the European Union has set targets for the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by up to
80-95 percent of 1990 levels by 2050 to keep the
global temperature increase below 2°C. However,
with the current fuel mix1, even the most ambi-
tious improvements to incumbent technologies
are likely to be insufficient for reaching the reduc-
tion targets set by the EU (Figure 1). Meeting
these targets requires a transition to an energy
and transport system built around low-carbon
technologies. However, the process of transition
will be fraught with market failures.
Energy system transition is a complex
undertaking. Hundreds of more-or-less proven low-
carbon technologies are competing for market
share in the low-carbon system. Selecting
technologies in an administrative or political
process is unlikely to be cost-effective. In order to
bring about the transition to a low-carbon energy
and transport system at the lowest cost,
policymakers should rely as much as possible on
private action to choose, develop, and deploy low-
carbon technologies. The policy challenge is to
develop the least distorting instruments for
preventing market failures. For those market
failures that might only be prevented with
technology-specific measures, the difficulty of
selecting from technologies of unknown merit
should be minimised by setting up a transparent
and predictable mechanism.
BACKGROUND
The current energy and transport system, in its
complexity, has developed over centuries. Though
it suffers from an extreme degree of inertia, it has
undergone a series of transformations in the past:
from wood to coal, coal to oil, and to electrification.
In each of these cases, the new energy source
proved either cheaper or more versatile than the
one it supplanted or complemented. Despite the
notable advantages of each successive fuel,
transitions took time: perhaps 200 years for coal
and 75 for both oil and electricity. These very slow
transitions were primarily due to path
dependencies and market failures.
Compared with earlier energy transitions, the
transition to a low-carbon energy and transport
system suffers from an additional bottleneck –
although new low-carbon technologies grant
positive environmental externalities and
additional side-benefits2, they are neither cheaper
nor more versatile than the technologies they aim
to replace. In fact, the substantial expensive
downstream changes to the incumbent energy or
transport system will require significant
investments. 
MARKET FAILURES IMPEDE A MEANINGFUL
TRANSITION
The environmental benefits that low-carbon tech-
nologies provide to society are not automatically
internalised by private investors and firms. Markets
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Figure 1: EU greenhouse gas emissions towards
an 80% domestic reduction (1990=100%)
Source: European Commission (2011).
alone will not encourage the development and
deployment of uncompetitive technologies, even
if they are necessary for a low-carbon future. Fur-
thermore, a number of market failures impede
the success of new low-carbon technologies at dif-
ferent stages of their development (including re-
search and development, demonstration, and
deployment).
At the R&D stages, there would be underinvest-
ment without effective policies to protect intellec-
tual property or to alleviate the private costs of
investment. Innovation, especially as it pertains
to specialised technologies, comes at a cost.
Although acquired knowledge may offset the cost
of R&D for the investing firm, investments confer
a positive externality to outside firms – they may
reduce the costs of production through beneficial
knowledge spillovers. This results in a situation in
which individual firms under-invest in R&D
because they cannot fully internalise the social
benefits of their investments or because they
anticipate costless benefits to be gained from the
investments of others.
At both the R&D and the demonstration stages,
the costs of exploring and building new markets
are high. These costs may not be fully recoverable
given that later entrants may reduce profit
margins. As a result, early movers might not be
willing to take risks and business exploration
investments may be hampered or slowed. This is
unfortunate as the exploration of new low-carbon
technology business models has high social
value. It provides important information to
consumers, competitors and politicians about the
viability of different business models and
technologies.
Additionally, deploying and exporting low-carbon
technologies might offer business opportunities
and increase competitiveness. Under certain con-
ditions, it is even conceivable that economies as
a whole might benefit from low-carbon technology
industries that were built on early local
deployment. For example, Denmark’s wind industry 3. Huberty and Zachmann
(2011).
4. Path-dependence based
on insufficient knowledge
at the beginning is not ex-
ante inefficient but can be
ex-post inefficient.
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‘Markets alone will not encourage the development and deployment of uncompetitive
technologies, even if they are necessary for a low-carbon future, and a number of market
failures impede the success of new low-carbon technologies at different stages.’
benefited from aggressive domestic market expan-
sion3. However, the early deployment of still non-
competitive low-carbon technologies will typically
not occur without public support.
At the deployment stage, even if competitive low-
carbon technologies were available, past technol-
ogy choices might have created a
difficult-to-overcome system that could hinder
quick rollout of new technologies. Such path-
dependence or lock-in, in the market failure sense,
is the inability of the market to switch technolo-
gies despite the knowledge that the incumbent
technology is inferior or undesirable relative to an
alternative (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995)4. The
market failure may exist for a number of reasons:
lock-in due to uncertain payoff functions occurs
because incumbent companies prefer to avoid
embarking on risky new technologies when
incumbent technologies are still profitable; lock-
in due to learning-by-doing is happening because
incumbent technologies have accumulated sig-
nificant process innovation over time while new
technologies would first need to improve to
become competitive; institutional lock-in is due to
the evolution of institutions around existing tech-
nologies, which creates a symbiotic relationship
that is focused on the incumbent technology;
and/or network effects that favour incumbent
technologies because the number of participants
in a system increases the value of the system for
all participants. High levels of uncertainty, coupled
with positive network externalities, may lead indi-
vidual firms to converge on a technology or energy
system that proves suboptimal ex post.
The energy and transport sector is highly capital-
intensive. Thus, poor coordination during the
transition would be very costly. Due to the high
number of interfaces required by energy systems,
the many stakeholders involved, and the
complexity of the technical questions that need to
be answered, complicated negotiations between
stakeholders may emerge. These negotiations
might take years and consume valuable
resources. First-movers who participate in the
Georg Zachmann  CUTTING CARBON, NOT THE ECONOMY
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5. Hybridisation and a large
niche market (suburban
commuters with home-
charging) could allow bat-
tery electric vehicles an
initial deployment without
substantial public infra-
structure investment.
6. We use the Market Model
Electric Mobility (MMEM) –
a simulation tool developed
by the European School of
Management and Technol-
ogy (ESMT, 2011). While
the underlying assump-
tions are based on the
German car market, the
results can generally be
transferred to the European
context.
coordination of standards may therefore impose
a positive externality on late-comers by absorbing
the costs of standardisation. Due to this market
failure, first-movers may prefer to form fragmented
networks/markets to avoid laborious and costly
coordination. Alternatively, in the absence of
stakeholder involvement in the coordination
process, a minority of firms might push through a
standard clearly not in the best interest of society.
Leaving coordination entirely to the market might
result in late deployment and fragmented
networks and markets.
Additionally, in order to deploy, some technologies
require a completely new underlying infrastruc-
ture. Infrastructure comes at a high cost, which
may not be fully recoverable for the initial
providers, especially if the business is regulated
ex post or late entrants face lower costs. To recoup
their initial investment, providers might have an
incentive to capture customers by implementing
artificial barriers to prevent switching. This can
also lead to fragmented markets and slow adap-
tation of new technologies.
The result of these market failures is that, though
private investment into new low-carbon technolo-
gies provides many positive spillovers for society,
companies will be reluctant to make the neces-
sary investments. Without public intervention, the
transition will either happen too slowly to achieve
the desired result, or may not take place at all.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF GAPS
The preponderance of market failures associated
with an energy transition, if not addressed at least
partially, will prevent certain low-carbon
technologies from entering the market. We use the
case of Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) as an
example of such a technology. FCEVs have the
potential to become a breakthrough low-carbon
transport technology (due to their range
advantage over current battery vehicles), but their
deployment is stymied by very high initial cost
(about €100,000 for a mid-class vehicle) and the
absence of the required dedicated infrastructure
(only about 100 hydrogen fuel stations in the
EU27). FCEVs are more sensitive to the
infrastructure externality than technologies such
as battery electric vehicles, and illustrate the
problems faced by similarly infrastructure-
sensitive technologies5. According to modeling
results6, under the existing framework conditions,
FCEVs will be virtually absent from the vehicle
market in 2050, while incumbent technologies
will still play a major role.
Figure 2 shows the results of the simulation exer-
cises. The results suggest that a comprehensive
package of measures could close the gap between
hydrogen fuel cell and other established or emerg-
ing propulsion technologies. Indeed, the results
indicate that only a concerted approach is likely
to lead to any significant increase in the market
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Figure 2: Simulation results, FCEV market share
Source: Bruegel based on ESMT (2011) and McKinsey & Company (2010). See Zachmann et al (2012)
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7. At this stage, modeling
results cannot indicate an
optimal mix of measures,
as the costs of the
individual policies are not
considered.
8. The volatility of national
fossil fuel taxation is a
telling example of the
volatility of taxation.
share of FCEVs in the foreseeable future. Employ-
ing a package that would combine infrastructure
support, R&D funding, and accounting for the
emission cost of conventional vehicles is likely to
lead to a market share approaching 12 percent in
2050 (Scenario 4, light blue line)7. While this is
still below the industry forecast scenario of 25
percent in 2050, it would serve to establish FCEVs
as a mass-market technology. Consequently,
policy is clearly key to bridging the gap for new
technologies. Whether this is the most efficient
policy intervention package depends, however, on
the cost of the policy mix.
Table 1 shows that the increasing share of FCEVs
under the concerted approach scenario are
accompanied by a reduction in the market share
of conventional (-1.8 percent for diesel and -2.5
percent for gasoline) and hybrid technologies 
(-2.8 percent for hybrids, -2.8 percent for plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles). Consequently, if the
hydrogen is produced by low-carbon technologies,
the replacement of the (partly) fossil-fuel based
technologies by FCEVs would result in greenhouse
gas reductions.
CONCLUSION
To incentivise the private sector to make the nec-
essary investments in low-carbon technologies,
policymakers should build on existing policy
instruments to address the gaps in support. We
propose some complementary instruments.
Inclusion of all forms of transport in the EU
emissions trading system
As vehicles become more fuel-efficient, a rebound
effect might become apparent. Consumers might
use cars more often when fuel consumption sav-
ings lead to lower driving costs relative to other
modes of transport. Lower fuel bills may also
mean more money to be spent on transport. A
Table 1: Market penetration (%)
Diesel Gasoline Hybrid LPG/CNG Biofuels Hydrogen BEV PHEV RE
2011 42.0 54.2 0.2 3.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2050 BAU 12.3 15.8 21.2 1.5 2.5 2.2 2.4 19.1 23.0
2050 Concerted 10.5 13.3 18.4 1.4 1.9 12.1 2.2 16.3 23.9
Source: Zachmann (2012). Note: LPG/CNG = liquid petroleum gas/compressed natural gas; BEV = battery electric vehicle;
PHEV = plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.
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price on carbon for fossil fuels is necessary to
stimulate efficient emissions-mitigation behav-
iour on the part of consumers.
An arbitrary price on carbon is, however, not
efficient. The proposed carbon component in the
fuel tax is insufficient for ensuring efficient
economy-wide greenhouse gas mitigation. A
carbon tax would be different from the volatile
marginal abatement costs in ETS-regulated
sectors. Transport fuels produced in different
sectors would then face different carbon costs. For
example, the electricity used in electric vehicles
(or for electrolysis to produce hydrogen) is
covered by the ETS, while gasoline production is
not covered by the ETS. Hence, fossil fueled
transport would abate too much/little if the carbon
tax is higher/lower than the ETS price. In addition,
taxes are a less good incentive for long-term
investment decisions because they can easily be
changed by policymakers8. Only a broad scheme
providing a single carbon price across sectors
would ensure cost-optimal abatement. Including
transport in the ETS could achieve this.
Furthermore, inclusion of transport in the ETS
would increase the depth of the carbon market
and make the system more resilient.
Implementation could be done by obliging fuel
outlets to buy emission allowances for the fuel
they sell. This would result in the harmonisation
of the carbon price across sectors and create an
incentive for the use of the cheapest available
abatement options. 
Lock-in of a long-term carbon price (government
credibility)
In addition to aligning the carbon cost across the
different transport sectors, governments can
reduce uncertainty for investors by providing
assurance that carbon would be sensibly priced
beyond 2020.
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Currently, the EU emission cap for 2020, the
sectoral coverage, the institutional setting beyond
2020 and other key elements of the ETS, are
subject to change. As investors cannot predict the
direction that likely political changes will have, the
ETS lacks credibility in the long-run, and thus fails
to provide clear long-term investment signals.
As it might be politically and institutionally
impossible to lock-in a credible long-term
commitment to a tight emissions trading system
in the absence of an international agreement,
second-best options for creating investment
certainty should be considered. 
A carbon floor price might seem attractive to
today’s low-carbon investors. However a general
floor price is a rather inflexible tool. In case future
carbon reduction potential turns out to be much
cheaper than anticipated (eg because of new
technologies or lower economic growth) a high
floor price could result in carbon reductions
becoming needlessly expensive. In addition, a
politically set floor is subject to change and hence
not credible in the long term.
A more targeted alternative would be the
establishment of bilateral option contracts
between public institutions and investors. The
public institutions would guarantee a certain
carbon price to an investor. In case the realised
carbon price is below the guaranteed price, the
public institution (the option writer) would pay the
difference to the investor (the option holder).
Hence, in case of a low carbon price, potentially
detrimental to the competitiveness of a low-
carbon investment, the investor gets some
compensation.
Thus, the investor’s risk is reduced. At the same
time, if the public institution issues a large volume
of option contracts, it creates an incentive to
future policymakers not to water down future
climate policies. Policies that reduce the carbon
price will have a direct budget impact by
increasing the value of the outstanding options.
This would tend to increase the long-term
credibility of carbon policies.
Schemes to drive supply-side investments
It has been argued that consumers do not properly
account for future fuel savings, because buyers of
new cars who shape the future car fleet are
typically less price sensitive than buyers on the
secondary market. In the absence of a global price
on carbon, the demand for low-carbon vehicles (on
both the primary and secondary market) is too
small to encourage massive investments in low-
carbon technologies. In this context, setting
vehicle fleet emission standards is an effective
second-best incentive for the provision of low-
carbon technologies. Tightening thresholds in
predictable way ensures that producers have
incentives to invest in clean alternative
technologies. For many consumers, reasonable
vehicle emission standards will come at little
additional cost, as the higher purchase price of
less-carbon intensive vehicles is largely
compensated for by fuel savings associated with
emission reductions. Thus, average emission
standards would play a key role in driving supply-
side provision of low-carbon technologies.
Encouraging private provision of infrastructure
In the phase after their installation, most stations
for newly introduced low-carbon fuels (such as
hydrogen, exchangeable batteries, biofuels, natu-
ral gas) will see limited use. Due to the initial low
load, most stations might only be able to cover
their variable costs in the first decade. Without a
clear prospect of recovery for their fixed costs, pri-
vate companies would refrain from installing new
fuelling stations. Public support for new refuelling
infrastructure is currently mainly coming from
local and regional initiatives. The corresponding
trials and demonstrations are so far unable to
break the chicken-and-egg problem of vehicles
and infrastructure. To provide the refuelling sta-
tions for new fuels, that markets alone would not
deliver, we suggest the establishment of tempo-
rary infrastructure consortia for the different low-
carbon fuels. Each consortium would plan and
organise the deployment of its respective fuelling-
station infrastructure. For this purpose, each con-
sortium would be given the exclusive right to
auction local concessions for new fuel stations to
interested retailers. This would ensure competi-
tion between different low-carbon fuels and
CUTTING CARBON, NOT THE ECONOMY Georg Zachmann
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‘Undifferentiated co-financing could create significant windfall profits and wastage. In the
presence of multiple new technologies, which compete not only for a market but also for
production factors, excessive support to one technology might even slow development.’
different retailers. Finally, each consortium might
organise internal cross-subsidisation between the
different parts of the value chain (eg fuel and vehi-
cle producers might support infrastructure), and
between different fuel stations (eg fuel outlets in
remote areas might obtain support from fuel out-
lets in densely populated areas), if it finds that
this encourages a quicker rollout of their technol-
ogy. To avoid abuse, all stakeholders should par-
ticipate in the consortia, the consortia should be
time-limited and their constitution should be
cleared ex ante by competition authorities.
Public procurement mechanisms
One major improvement to current deployment
policies would be to make public procurement
more oriented towards the long-term by using it
strategically for experimenting with alternative
technologies. We suggest that publicly financed
trials (eg for municipal vehicle fleets) be allowed
to fail commercially. Using public procurement to
conduct real-world experiments could uncover
valuable information and avoid focusing only on
low-risk technologies. Such a scheme requires
that the responsible local, municipal or regional
public authorities are able to accept failures in the
trials they are conducting. Consequently, federal
or European compensation mechanisms might be
necessary.
Transparent and predictable policy response
Existing horizontal policies, including carbon
prices or patent legislation, and the approaches
proposed in this Policy Contribution, are not tech-
nology-specific. However, existing and proposed
measures will not eliminate all externalities. In the
absence of horizontal first-best solutions for some
market failures, the public sector might want to
return to technology-specific support instruments
for R&D and deployment9. In this context, the
question of technology choice is critical.
Industrial stage R&D, demonstration projects and
support for deployment are not technology-neu-
tral. Publicly funding large-scale demonstration
and deployment projects for all technologies
would not only be extremely expensive, it would
also ignore the fact that different technologies are
contemporaneously in different stages of their
development. Undifferentiated co-financing could
create significant windfall profits and wastage. In
the presence of multiple new technologies which
compete not only for a market but also for pro-
duction factors, excessive support to one technol-
ogy might even slow development. Government
action may provide a focal point for a ‘less effi-
cient’ technology, not only directing its own finan-
cial resources but also other production factors
(skilled labour, capital, etc) away from the more
efficient technologies.
Thus, the public needs to select which technology
to support, when and how. This decision is
extremely difficult as it involves evaluating
technologies of unknown future merits. Due to the
high uncertainties inherent in an energy and
transport system transition, it is likely that some
technologies will not live up to their promises.
Selecting a portfolio of technologies is warranted,
in order to make the vital transition resilient to
unexpected shocks. Furthermore, coordination
among member states is crucial for avoiding
costly incompatibilities of national energy and
transport systems. The EU should adopt a choice
mechanism that is dynamic, adaptive and able to
digest new information. This mechanism should
optimise support in a quick, reliable and effective
manner. In order to enable both industry and
consumers to form the right expectations over the
direction of technology, mechanism transparency
is critical. The only way to control the potential
impacts of public policy on industry investment
choices, and promote fair competition, is through
a transparent policy clearly communicating
government priorities and decision parameters.
Predictability and technology-neutrality can only
be ensured when technology choice is based on
transparent and defined metrics and priorities.
Stakeholders need to have incentives to provide
9. And as a matter of politi-
cal reality policymakers find
it easier to demonstrate the
visible ‘success’ of technol-
ogy-specific interventions
(eg a milestone of 1 million
electric vehicles).
Georg Zachmann  CUTTING CARBON, NOT THE ECONOMY
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10. Developers of different
technologies may have an
interest in overstating the
capabilities or understating
the cost of their respective
technologies in order to
attract more support (or
even lock out competitors).
11. According to the Euro-
pean Commission (COM
(2011) 808) “around 35
percent of the Horizon 2020
budget will be climate
related expenditure”.
12. According to the
German Council of Eco-
nomic Experts, in 2011 the
net present value of all
feed-in tariff obligations
alone amounts to €80 bil-
lion. This is about 2 percent
of Germany’s GDP.
unbiased forecasts of the capabilities of their
technology10. These forecasts should be
processed in an open multi-technology model to
provide guidance for the targeting of support. A
corresponding model should be built, maintained,
extended and published by an independent public
institution. This transparent mechanism would
ensure that stakeholders can predict public
technology decisions, and thus find it easier to
commit to the long-term and risky investments
needed to make the low-carbon energy and
transport system transition a reality.
Along these lines, the European Commission has
put some effort into devising a support
methodology. The Strategic Energy Technology
Plan (SET Plan) and independent technology
reviews by the EU Joint Research Centre are two
key instruments developed by the Commission.
However, the SET Plan does not answer the
essential questions: which technology should be
supported? When and how? A comprehensive
multi-technology view is currently lacking in
policy decisions. In the same vein, the EU’s new
innovation funding programme, Horizon 2020,
slated to distribute some €80 billion between
2014 and 202011, will not rely on an open multi-
technology model to guide the targeting of
support. If the EU continues along this path, major
technology choices will be at best backed-up by
the non-transparent and proprietary energy
models currently used by the Commission, and at
worst largely at the mercy of shifting politics.
In contrast to a ‘shot-in-the-dark’ definition of
thresholds or numbers (such as 50-50 co-
financing or one-million cars in 2020), a
transparent choice mechanism may promote
more coordination between regions, nations, and
firms. The cost of the transition is put at several
percentage points of GDP12. Therefore, large-scale
government intervention will be unavoidable. To
avoid extensive inefficiencies, a structured
approach, adapted to the complexity of the
challenge, is warranted.
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